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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-2399 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
    
v. 
 
DONALD JONES, 
       Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-08-cr-00007-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 1, 2016 
Before:  FISHER, SHWARTZ and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: September 8, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                                             
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
 Donald Jones, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s 
denial of his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  We will 
affirm. 
I. 
 In 2008, Jones pleaded guilty to possessing crack cocaine with the intent to 
distribute and related charges.  He received a sentence of 120 months in prison.  Jones 
was subject to a then-10-year statutory mandatory minimum term because 36.98 grams of 
crack cocaine were involved in his crimes and he had a prior felony drug conviction.  See 
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006).  Jones appealed; we granted the Government’s 
motion to enforce his appellate waiver and to summarily affirm in light of the appellate 
waiver.  See United States v. Jones, C.A. No. 08-4111 (order entered on Mar. 18, 2009). 
 Since then, Jones has mounted multiple unsuccessful post-conviction challenges to 
his sentence.  This appeal concerns Jones’ January 7, 2015, request for a sentence 
reduction under § 3582(c)(2) based on United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), 
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), and recent amendments to the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines.  The District Court denied the motion, and Jones appeals.1   
II. 
                                                             
1 In filings submitted to this Court, Jones alleges the District Court violated his right to 
due process by ruling on his motion before he had an opportunity to reply to the 
Government’s response.  Jones also alleges the timing of the District Court’s ruling 
demonstrates actual bias against him and that the District Court erred by initially staying 
his motion.  We disagree.  The District Court did not err by staying the motion or issuing 
its order after considering the Government’s response and determining that Jones was not 
entitled to relief based on the record.  The timing of the ruling and that fact that it was 
adverse to Jones does not demonstrate bias, actual or implied.  See generally 
SecuraComm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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 We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review of the District Court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines and 
review the denial of Jones’ § 3582(c)(2) motion for abuse of discretion.  United States v. 
Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 154 (3d Cir. 2009).   
III. 
 A district court may reduce the sentence of a defendant “who has been sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been 
lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . . if such a reduction is consistent with 
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(2).  A reduction is not authorized under § 3582(c)(2) if the change to the 
Sentencing Guidelines “does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable 
guideline range because of the operation of another guideline or statutory provision (e.g., 
a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment).”  U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) & cmt. n.1(A); see United States v. Ortiz-Vega, 
744 F.3d 869, 873 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[I]f a defendant is subjected to a mandatory 
minimum, he or she would not be given a sentence ‘based on a sentencing range that has 
subsequently been lowered.’”) 
 In 2010, the Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”) increased the quantity of crack cocaine 
necessary to trigger the 10-year mandatory minimum for prior felony drug offenders from 
5 grams to 28 grams.  See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii).  The Sentencing Commission 
promulgated amendments to conform the Guidelines to the FSA and to make the changes 
apply retroactively.  See U.S.S.G. app. C, amends. 750, 759 (2011).  Additionally, 
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Amendment 782 to the Guidelines, which came into effect on November 1, 2014, and has 
been applied retroactively, reduced by two the base offense levels assigned to specific 
drug quantities.  See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) & app. C. supp., amends. 782, 788 (2014).   
 The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jones’ latest request for a 
reduced sentence.  See Mateo, 560 F.3d at 154.  As we have explained previously, see 
United States v. Jones, C.A. No. 14-3488, 605 F. App’x 81, 82 (3d Cir. 2015), the FSA, 
which went into effect in 2010, does not apply retroactively to Jones, who was sentenced 
in 2008.  See United States v. Reevey, 631 F.3d 110, 115 (3d Cir. 2010).  The Sentencing 
Commission, however, has exercised its authority to make various amendments to the 
Guidelines—including its changes in response to the FSA—retroactive.  See United 
States v. Curet, 670 F.3d 296, 309–10 (1st Cir. 2012).  Nevertheless, Jones cannot benefit 
from the recent Guidelines amendments.  The amendments do not “have the effect of 
lowering [his] applicable guideline range” because he was sentenced to a statutory 
mandatory minimum term.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A).  
We also reject Jones’ arguments that Booker and Kimbrough counsel a different result.  
Those cases do not provide a basis for a sentence reduction not otherwise permitted under 
§ 3582(c)(2).  See Mateo, 560 F.3d at 155-56.   
IV. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
